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INTHE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

MACK FINANCIAL
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsNEVADA MOTOR RENTALS,
INC.,
Defendant-Appellant. J

Case No.
13603

B R I E F OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to recover a deficiency judgment,
costs, and attorneys fees as the result of the defendantappellant's default under motor vehicle conditional sale
agreement.
DISPOSITION IN T H E LOWER COURT
The court ruled in favor of the respondent's claim
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against the appellant, Nevada Motor Rentals, finding
that the respondent was entitled to a judgment for the
unpaid balance on its claim against Nevada Motor
Rentals on the seven trucks purchased under sales agreements, less the net amount received by the plaintiff
upon its sale of the trucks in January, 1972, and less
any amount Nevada Motor Rentals would be entitled
to as an offset on its counter-claim. The court also
allowed the recovery of out-of-pocket expenses incurred
in preparing the trucks for public sale and the holding
of said sale. The court then ruled that it did not have
jurisdiction over W . J . Digby on a personal basis, and
therefore dismissed him for lack of jurisdiction. The
trial court then found that the seven trucks in question
should have been sold in June of 1970 rather than January of 1972, and found that the defendant-appellant
had been damaged by loss due to depreciation in the
sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars
($40,750.00), which should be granted by way of offset, leaving a net judgment in favor of the plaintiff respondent, and against the defendant-appellant, Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., in the sum of Forty-Seven
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Seven and 09/100
Dollars ($47,367.09), plus interest at the contract rate,
and court costs in the sum of Five Hundred Five and
91/100 Dollars ($505.91). The trial court refused to
award attorneys fees to the plaintiff-respondent even
though finding that attorneys fees had been contracted
for in the agreement of the parties.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-respondent has filed a cross-appeal
and seeks the following relief:
1. A reversal of the trial court's holding that the
reasonable time when the seven trucks should have been
sold was June 30, 1970, and a determination in its place
that the trucks were sold at a reasonable time, which
would result in the deletion of the offset in the judgment in the defendant-appellant's favor in the sum of
Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($40,750.00), which would result in an increase in the judgment in favor of the plaintiff-respondent in the additional sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($40,750.00).
2. A determination that the court had jurisdiction
over W . J . Digby who was, either directly or through
the means of agency, doing business within the State of
Utah sufficient to subject him to the jurisdiction of the
court.
3. A determination that the court erred in holding
that no attorneys fees should be awarded the plaintiff,
and a direction to the trial court to determine what attorneys fees were reasonable, and award them to the
plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the contract.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff-respondent, is in basic agreement with
many of the facts stated by the defendant-appellant.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
Those are the facts found by Judge Croft in his Memorandum Decision of April 6, 1973, denying defendant's
motion for summary judgment. (R. 620) Those facts
are listed by number as set out under the defendantappellant's statement of facts, numbers 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ; 5 ; 6 ;
7; 8; part of 9, but excluding the wording ". . . and was
the only contact which Nevada Motor Rentals had in
the State of Utah."; 11, excepting the figure of "$217,603.05," which should be "$127,603.05"; 12; 13; 14;
15; 16; 17; 18; 19; 20; and 24. The remaining statement of facts made by the defendant-appellant, are not
agreed with, inasmuch as they omit certain material
aspects of the facts alleged, and to some extent make
over-statements of facts unsupported by any evidence.
The following additional statements of fact are
pertinent and necessary to the appeal:
1. Even though the seven trucks in question were
driven to Mack Trucks, Inc.'s lot in Denver, Colorado,
sometime after February 1, 1970, the plaintiff-respondent did not assert any possessory right to said vehicles
until January, 1972, at which time said vehicles were
repossessed, put in a saleable condition, and sold. (R.18
and Exhibit 17-P)
2. Before the trucks could be sold after their repossession, out-of-pocket expenses totalling Two Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Seven and 31/100 Dollars
($2,477.31) for preparing the trucks for and holding
the sale in January, 1972, were necessarily incurred,
and that same amount would have been incurred regard-
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less of when in point of time aHer February. 1U70. ^aid
trucks had been sold. (R. 83, and Exhibit 17-P and
18-P
\ i t e r tile se\ * n l / u e k s were a b a n d o n e d

»u the

lot ot .Mack Trucks, i n , . . 1 >*-n\ - • Colorado, and
Mack Financial Corporation learned -! their abandonment Do:, l")io-b\ ,M ' Let Sr-.'H
< re requested by
,,
,
Maek ! !ii!i-.' ;i! i orporation to submit a proposal in
disposing of the trucks at that time, and then agreeing
upon how a deficiency would be handled and taken
care of; but D o n Digby, for Nevada Motor Rentals,
failed to contact Mack Financial Corporation concerning such a pp»|M-a! \x '<; I ~)
•4. r r o m ! l M nun the seven i n i r k - i n qiifNlion were
abandoned on
K; < Mark ' I ' n i u - i
i Denver,
Colorado ;i !ii she lime they were repossessed by Mack
Fnnneia! v •• *p»--raiin5 n J a n u a r y , 1972, the maximum
depreciation on each truck amounted to Three Thousand
Dollars ($3,000.00), for a total of possible maximum
depreciation of Twenty-One Thousand Dollars ($21,000.00). (R. m >
5. The transaction net ween Nevada Mwi.w Hmlals, entered into j u s t prior i<- the abandoment • •-! 'hi
trucks by Scott lu .Se\ada M^h-i H e H a i ^ and then
Nevada \l--n-r Rentals n» Mark I
i
h r involved
not onl\ ht purchase or hai^i'er of seven trucks, but
aisf > .* in * ! rucking considerations including a meat haul
out of Gooding. Idaho, and a beer haul from Colorado
to Idaho fTM"-- ,
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6. Notice of the sale of the seven vehicles in question, after their repossession in January, 1972, was
given by publication in the Denver Post, the Rocky
Mountain News, and the Adams County Almanac.
Notice was also sent to the attorney for the Nevada
Motor Rentals, Inc. dated January 11, 1972. (Exhibits
5-P, 6-P, 7-P, and an unnumbered page between R. 453
and 454, R. 690-691)
7. The defendant-appellant, on February 15,
1969, executed an extension of conditional sale agreement for chattel mortgage, which covered transactions
including the seven trucks in question in the lawsuit,
and as a term of said contract agreed that if said contract
was placed in the hands of an attorney for collection,
it, as the buyer, would pay the reasonable attorneys
fees incurred by the plaintiff-respondent. (Exhibit 3-P
and 4-P)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E U T A H COURT H A S JURISDICTION OVER N E V A D A MOTOR R E N T ALS, INC.
The appellant, in its brief, characterizes the visit
of Donald Digby, an officer and agent of Nevada Motor
Rentals, Inc. in the State of Utah as a mere conversation
in which no actual business was performed. This, however, is not born out by the record. The record reflects
that Mr. Digby of Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. came
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to Utah, and specifically to the office of Mack Financial
Corporation in Salt Lake City, Utah, for the express
purpose of persuading them to contact Lee Scott of
Boise, Idaho, and making arrangements with him to
purchase the seven trucks in question from Nevada
Motor Rentals, Inc. under a treasury transfer agreement wherein he was to assume the obligation of Nevada
Motor Rentals, Inc., without, however, relieving them
of their liability to Mack Financial Corporation in the
event Lee Scott defaulted on the payments. (R. 5)
The entire situation which brought about the litigation presently before the court had its origin with
that visit of Mr. Digby, the Vice-President of Nevada
Motor Rentals, Inc. with Mack Financial Corporation
in the State of Utah. Title 78-27-24, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, cited and relied upon by the appellant in
its brief gives the Utah Court jurisdiction over any
person who, in person or through an agent, transacts
" . . . any business within this State."
After the business transaction was set up in the
State of Utah by the appellant's Vice-President, the
contract was then made so as to be performable within
the State of Utah.
This court's treatment of jurisdictional questions
under the provisions of Title 78-27-24, U.C.A., 1953, in
both the Hill v. Zale Corporation, 25 Utah 2d 357, 482
P . 2d 332, cited by the appellant, and in the decision
handed down in Foreign Study League v. HollandAmerican Line, 27 Utah 2d 442, 49 P . 2d 244, has
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been consistent with the generally accepted notion that
jurisdiction of the court should be expanded where the
rights of its inhabitants have been affected by some conduct carried on within the State. If the conduct of Mr.
Digby, the Vice-President of Nevada Motor Rentals,
Inc., in coming to Utah and arranging for a transaction
which ultimately goes sour, and results in a dispute over
responsibility for the payment of trucks, does not constitute the doing of any business within the State, then it
would be very difficult to formulate an instance in
which a non-resident would under any circumstances be
doing business within the State.
In addition to that particular activity, the trucks
of Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., which are leased to
Digby Truck Lines, are operated through Utah and
upon the public highways of the State of Utah, which,
is an additional act of doing business within the State.
(R. 156)
POINT II

IF THE SALE OF THE SEVEN
TRUCKS IN QUESTION W A S NOT
"COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE,"
THE PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES, UNDER THE APPLICABLE
LAW, W O U L D BE THE ACTUAL
LOSS CAUSED BY A FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The trial court found in its findings of fact that
the sale of the vehicles in 1972 was commercially unreasonable because it was delayed by a period of nearly
two years. The court further found that the reasonable
time when the seven trucks should have been sold was
June 30, 1970, and that had the seven trucks in question
been sold on June 30, 1970, they would have brought
Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($40,750.00) more than they did when sold January 25, 1972.
The court accordingly allowed the appellant as an offset against the judgment awarded to the respondent the
sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars
($40,750.00).
The appellant cites three "leading cases" that supposedly represent a "majority view" where the court
allegedly denied a deficiency where the sale was not
commercially reasonable. In reading those three cases,
however, the deficiency was denied not because the sale
was commercially unreasonable, but because the debtor
was not given notice of the sale by the creditor. That,
of course, was one of the contentions of the appellant
at trial and is also raised on appeal under another point;
however, the trial court found that notice had, in fact,
been given to the debtor-appellant by the creditor-respondent. (R. 690, Finding #13)
Appellant then goes on to argue that some courts
under the old Uniform Conditional Sales Act also held
that where a sale was commercially unreasonable that
a deficiency judgment would not be allowed, and in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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support thereof, they cite two West Virginia cases, one
decided in 1926 and one decided in 1930.
The Uniform Commercial Code, which has, for the
most part, been adopted by the State of Utah, and all
of the other states where any of the parties to the action
had any business dealings, specifically provides that a
debtor's exclusive remedy for violations of the act is a
Section 9-507-(1) claim for damages. That section of
the Utah Commercial Code is Title 70A-9-507 (1), 1953,
and reads, as the Uniform Commercial Code, as follows:
"If it is established that the secured party is
not proceeding in accordance with the provisions of this part, disposition may be ordered
or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred, the
debtor or any person entitled to notification or
whose security interest has been made known
to the secured party prior to the disposition
has a right to recover from the secured party
any loss caused by a failure to comply with the
provisions of this part. If the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to recover
in any event an amount not less than the credit
service charge plus 10% of the principal amount of the debt or the time-price differential
plus 10% of the cash price."
Neither that Section, nor any other section of the
Commercial Code, suggests that the proper remedy is
punitive in nature, as suggested by the appellant, which
would deny a deficiency judgment to a secured party
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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who failed to comply with the Commercial Code by dotting every "i" and crossing every "t," or in creating a
presumption that after an improper sale, the actual
value of the collateral is presumed to equal the debtor's
obligation.
In reading the Commercial Code, and the cases
decided under it, it appears that the debtor's exclusive
remedy after discovering that some aspect of the sale
was commercially unreasonable, is a Section 9-507 (1)
claim for damages. A case which illustrates this point
is Abbot Motors, Inc. vs. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec.
35, 5 U.C.C. Rep. 788 (1964). In that case, the court
was dealing with a secured party's suit for a deficiency
judgment after the secured party failed to proceed in
accordance with Section 9-504(3). In agreeing with the
creditor's contention that conducting a sale in other
than a commercially reasonable manner does not bar
the recovery, but only gives the debtor a Section 9-507(1) claim for damages, the court stated that the "Defendant is not execused from his debt because of an error
in the procedure of his secured creditor in applying the
collateral upon his debt and unless it is plainly so provided by the statute." Id 43.
The New York Supreme Court, in the case of
Chase Manhatten Bank v. Lyon Hair, Inc., 8 U.C.C.
Rep. 1121, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971), agreed with the position taken in Abbot and held that the debtor's contention
that the secured party's failure to comply with Section
9-504(3) absolved him of liability was without merit.
The court simply reasoned that Section 9-507 sets out
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the penalty for non-compliance with Section 9-504, and
relieving the debtor from liability is not among the remedies prescribed.
•••!;••
The Washington Supreme Court reached a similar
decision; however, that was concerning the notice provision violation of Section 9-504, and would, therefore,
be a case contrary to those cited by the appellant in its
brief under this point. See Grant County Tractor Company, Inc. v. Nuss, 496 P . 2d 966, 6 Wash. App. 866
(1972). That was an action by a seller-creditor of a
tractor and other farm equipment against the buyers
for a deficiency. The creditor came into possession of
the debtor's tractor, which was held as security, and in
the course of events sold the tractor without first giving
notice to the debtor-defendant. The trial court found
that the balance due on the contract for that amount
was $3, 507.00, but refused to enter judgment for that
amount " . . . because plaintiff failed to give notice to the
defendants of the sale of the tractor." The creditor
excepted to the trial court's ruling, and filed the appeal.
The Washington Supreme Court, in reversing the
trial court's denial of a deficiency judgment, cited the
line of authority relied upon by the appellant in this
case, namely, Leasco case and the Skeels case, and
then go on to adopt the other line of authority. In doing
so, they state:
"***The other line of authority holds that the
failure to give notice does not prevent a deficiency. Universal C.I.T. Credit Company v.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Bone, 453 S.W. 2d 37, (Ark. 1970); Weaver
v. O'Meara Motor Company, 452 P . 2d 87
(Alas. 1969) \T kW Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage Barn, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 328, 258 A.
2d 162 (1969) ; Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. &
Loan Corporation, 415 S.W. 2d 347 (C.A.
Tenn. 1966). We adopt the reasoning of the
second line of cases.
"R.C.W. 62 A. 9-504(2), quoted above, provides that the debtor is liable for a deficiency,
if there is no agreement to the contrary.
R.C.W. 62 A. 9-507 (1), provides:
'(1) If it is established that the secured
party is not proceeding in accordance with
the provisions of this part disposition may
be ordered to or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has occurred, the debtor or any person entitled to notification or whose
security interest has been made known to
the secured party prior to the disposition
has a right to recover from the secured
party in the loss caused by a failure to
comply with the provisions of this part.
'Under this provision, if the creditor fails
to give notice to the debtor as required by
R.C.W. 62 A. 9-504 (3), the debtor has a
right to recover from the creditor any loss
caused by the failure to give that notice.
Thus, in the instant case, if the sale of the
tractor without notice had resulted in a
loss to the defendants, the defendants
would have a right in the instant proceedDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing to claim that loss against the deficiency
sought by the plaintiff. In view of this
remedy, we are of the opinion the writers
of the Uniform Commercial Code did not
intend that the creditors' failure to give
notice would result in a forfeiture of the
creditors' right to a deficiency. See Hogan,
Pitfalls in Default Procedure, 2 U.C.C.
L.J. 244, 257 (1969).'
The appellants seek to broaden the application of
Section 9-507 to the point of its being a punitive statute,
and in doing so, read into it terms that it does not contain. A logical analysis of that Section indicates that it
is compensatory in nature, and that it sets out the remedy
of the secured party to recover "any loss caused by a
failure to comply with the provisions" of the act. That is
the construction given it by the trial court wherein the
trial court found that the loss occasioned by the failure
to hold the sale in a commercially reasonable manner
was Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars
($40,750.00). Even though the respondent does not
agree with that figure, and will hereafter assert that the
maximum amount of the offset should have been
Twenty-One Thousand Dollars ($21,000.00), the respondent takes the position that the court properly applied the damage statute of the Commercial Code by
assessing damages rather than resorting to a harsh forfeiture position advocated by the appellant.
The trial court's application is consistent with the
Utah Supreme Court's position taken in the case of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 U.2d 370, 335 P.2d 404, wherein
the court announced its position as being opposed to
forfeitures, and adopting the rule that damages rather
than forfeitures are favored.
POINT III
T H E COURT H A V I N G F O U N D T H E
APPELLANT RECEIVED NOTICE
OF T H E SALE, T H E A P P E L L A N T S
C O N T E N T I O N T H A T NO D E F I C I E N CY J U D G M E N T M A Y B E A S S E S S E D
W H E R E NOTICE OF SALE IS ABS E N T OR D I F I C I E N T I S MOOT.
Even though, under the provisions of Section 9-504
(3), the notice requirement relied upon by the appellant
is not required, the trial court found that, in fact, notice
had been given.
Sub-Paragraph (3) of Section 9-504 of the Commercial Code does away with the necessity of notice if
the "collateral is perishable or threatens to decline
speedily in value, or is of a type customarily sold on a
recognized market." (Emphasis added.) The seven
trucks in question were, as the trial court noted in its
Memorandum Decision denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment, were of the "type customarily sold
on a recognized market," so there really was no need
for a notice. (R. 633)
The court did, however, after considering all of the
evidence, including respondent's counsel's letter to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appellant's counsel dated January 11, 1972, (unnumbered page between R. 453 and R. 454) and the showing
proof of publication in three newspapers of general
circulation in the area where the sale was held (Exhibit
5-P, 6-P, and 7-P), found that notice of the sale had
been given to the appellant, (R. 690, Finding No. 13)
The facts of the case before the court are also similar, and even identical on this point, with the facts of the
earlier cited Washington Supreme Court case of Grant
County Tractor Company v. Nuss, 496 P . 2d 966, 6
Washington App. 866 (1972). In that case, as in the
instant case where the debtor unilaterally and voluntarily
delivered the seven trucks in question to Mack Trucks,
Inc., with, according to their testimony, the express
intention of giving them complete control of the security,
noting that the debtor did the same thing in the Grant
Company Tractor case, the Washington Supreme Court
stated:
" Further, it should be noted that defendants
unilaterally and voluntarily delivered to plaintiff complete control of the security and gave
written notice of their election to rescind the
transaction. I t has been held that such conduct
constitutes a waiver of the debtor's right to
reasonable notice of an impending sale or
estops the debtor from claiming a violation of
the statute. Nelson v. Monarch Investment,
Inv. Plan of Henderson, Inc. 452 S.W. 2d
375 (C.A. Ky. 1970)"
Also, even if the trial court had found that notice
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had not been given, the remedy under the Commercial
Code for that violation is also Section 9-507(1), which
makes the debtor's exclusive remedy a claim for damages,
and is not punitive in nature so as to deny him a deficiency. That, however, does not even come into play in
this case inasmuch as the trial court did make a finding,
based upon competent evidence, that the appellant received notice of the sale, both directly, and through its
being published in three newspapers of general circulation where the sale was held and where the appellants
were doing business.
P O I N T IV
T H E T R I A L COURT'S D E T E R M I N A TION T H A T T H E SEVEN V E H I C L E S
IN QUESTION DEPRECIATED IN
T H E SUM O F F O R T Y T H O U S A N D
SEVEN H U N D R E D F I F T Y DOLL A R S ($40,750.00) I S I N C O R R E C T ,
•P A N D T H E M A X I M U M A M O U N T O F
DEPRECIATION, AND THEREFORE
THE APPELLANTS M A X I M U M
DAMAGES, IS ONLY TWENTY-ONE
T H O U S A N D D O L L A R S ($21,000.00).
The testimony presented at trial concerning the
value of the vehicles in question came from Mr. Roddy,
who has been in the trucking business as a salesman and
mechanic for many years for several different companies;
Mr. Alward, who had been in the truck sales business
for approximately one year at the time he saw "some
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trucks" belonging to Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc., and
then three current employees of the appellant who testified they had certain sums of money that they would
have been willing to pay for trucks, but which they
admittedly would not have paid for the trucks without
first having driven them, ascertained their mechanical
condition, etc.
The testimony of all of the witnesses was admittedly
in conflict, and the trial judge, sitting as both the trier
of the law and of the fact, had to make a determination
from all of the evidence as to what the true facts were.
The appellant relies heavily upon the testimony of
Donald Digby to the effect that the trucks must have
been worth $18,000.00 each inasmuch as he had entered
into a recent business deal with Lee Scott to purchase
the trucks for that sum of money; however, after Mr.
Scott had the trucks for a few days he, for some reason
or the other, returned them to Mr. Digby at Nevada
Motor Rentals, Inc. Also, the transaction entered into
between Scott and Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. involved
more than the mere purchase of seven trucks, but also
involved arrangements for meat hauls out of Idaho, and
beer hauls into Idaho, and other transportation considerations. (R. 161, R. 692)
When Mr. Alward appraised a group of trucks at
Nevada Motor Rentals' yard in Denver, Colorado, in
January, 1970, he had been in truck sales for one year,
(R. 186) H e looked at a group of Mack Trucks and
White Freightliners, 1967 and 1968 models, and made
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appraisals for the purpose of offering a trade-in price
on some of the used trucks in connection with a deal he
was trying to make to sell them new trucks. (R. 195)
At the time of trial in April, 1973, he did not have any
appraisals with him, had not reviewed them prior to the
trial inasmuch as he didn't know why he was appearing
at trial, and had no idea of what trucks, by serial number, he had even appraised, but only that there were some
1967 model and some 1968 model Macks and White
Freightliners. (R. 184 - 187)
The Nevada Motor Rental employees who testified
that they would be willing to pay $16,000 to $18,000 to
purchase a vehicle admittedly did not drive the vehicles,
or otherwise test them, and would not have paid that
kind of money for a truck without first driving it, having
it tested, and otherwise determining that it was worth
that kind of money, and their testimony was not, therefore, to the effect that the seven vehicles in question,
or any of them, were worth anywhere near from $16,000
to $18,000. (R. 207-225)
John Roddy, who is the used truck manager of the
Mack Trucks, Denver, Colorado, branch testified that
he had made periodic appraisals of the seven vehicles
in question from the time Nevada Motor Rentals abandoned the vehicles on the Mack Trucks' lot in Denver
and produced copies of the appraisals made by him.
(Exhibit B-19 and B-20)
Mr. Roddy's experience in the heavy trucking
business is extensive and goes back many years. In
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addition to his employment with Mack Trucks, Inc. both
as Service Manager and Used Truck Manager, he has
been employed over the years by General Motors, International Harvester, Colorado Kenworth, Ford Motor
Company, and other trucking concerns.
Having inspected and appraised the trucks from
time to time during the two-year period they were on the
Mack Truck lot in Denver, Colorado, he expressed an
opinion, based upon his background and his knowledge
of the trucks, that the units had depreciated in the toal
sum of Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00) per unit
over the two-year period. (R. 113) The total depreciation of the seven units was, therefore, according to Mr.
Roddy's expert testimony, the total sum of Twenty-One
Thousand Dollars. ($21,000.00)
POINT V
T H E OUT-OF-POCKET E X P E N S E S
I N T H E SUM O F T W O T H O U S A N D
FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN
A N D 31/100 D O L L A R S
($2,477.31)
W E R E NECESSARILY INCURRED
TO P R E P A R E T H E T R U C K S F O R
SALE, AND WOULD H A V E NECESSARILY BEEN I N C U R R E D REGARDLESS OF W H E N T H E TRUCKS
W E R E SOLD.
The appellant fails to cite any portion of the record
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in support of the contentions raised in Point V of its
brief.
John Roddy, the Utah Truck Manager of Mack
Trucks' Denver, Colorado, branch, who was involved
with the sale of the trucks after reviewing the exhibits
representing the Two Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Seven and 31-100 Dollars ($2,477.31) expended by
Mack Financial Corporation in preparing the trucks
for sale, including advertising them, and who was involved in getting them ready for sale and conducting
the sale, at the request of Mack Financial Corporation,
testified that the charges were reasonable and necessary,
and that the same charges would have been necessarily
incurred regardless of when in point of time the trucks
had been sold after they were abandoned on the Mack
Trucks' lot by Nevada Motor Rentals, Inc. (R. 83)
The contention of Point V of the appellant's brief
is, therefore, unsupported by the record, and the outof-pocket expenses incurred by the respondent in advertising the sale of the trucks, and in getting them
ready for sale so as to obtain the best possible price for
them, is a recoverable expense, as was found by the
trial court.
P O I N T VI
T H E C O M P U T A T I O N OF T H E
COURT OF T H E J U D G M E N T IN T H E
SUM O F F O R T Y - S E V E N T H O U S A N D
T H R E E HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
A N D 09/100 D O L L A R S
($47,367.09)
W A S CORRECT, USING T H E FIGURES O T H E R W I S E FOUND BY T H E
COURT, BUT T H A T F I G U R E
SHOULD BE REVISED UPWARD
A F T E R REDUCING T H E AMOUNT
OF T H E SETOFF AWARDED IN
FAVOR OF T H E A P P E L L A N T .
The computation used by the court in arriving at
the Forty-Seven Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Seven
and 09/100 Dollars, ($47,367.09), figure is as follows:
Explanation
April 15, 1970, Payoff
Interest to June 30, 1970
Total Due on June 30, 1970
Less Loss for Non-Sale as of
June 30, 1970
Total Due after Adjustment on
June 30, 1970
Interest from July 1, 1970, to
June 30, 1971
Total Due as of June 30, 1971
Interest from July 1,1971, thru
January, 1972
Total Due through January, 1972
Costs of Sale
Less Sales Price
Balance After Sale
Interest from February 1, 1972,
to January 31, 1973
Total Due as of January 31, 1973

Amount
109,673.97
2,399.12
112,073.09
-40,750.00
71,323.09
7,488.92
78,812.01
4,827.24
83,639.25
2,477.31
-44,700.00
41,416.56
4,348.74
45,765.30
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Interest from February thru
May, 1973
Total Amount of Judgment

1,601.79
47,367.09

The trial court, in using the above figures, makes
a clear and accurate accounting by breaking the figures
at each occasion where a significant event occurred. By
handling the accounting in that manner, the appellant
is charged interest on the appropriate amount owing to
the respondent within the frame work of time when
certain significant events occurred to change the principal amount the appellant owed the respondent.
The appellant's contention was considered by the
trial court both originally, and on the appellant's posttrial motions, and was rejected by the trial court inasmuch as it did not consider the fact that the principal
amount the appellant owed the respondent changed from
time to time with the happening of certain events, and
would, therefore, have to be computed separately for
each change in the principal amount on which interest
could be charged. The appellant's proposal, which was
rejected by the trial court, was and is that interest
should only be charged on the lowest amount of principal
owed at any given time, rather than computed separately
on the changing amount of principal owed as that
amount would change with the occurrence of events as
found by the court.
The respondent, by way of cross-appeal, contends
that the only figure that should be changed is the setoff
in the sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
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Dollars, ($40,750.00), under the explanation of "Less
Loss for Non-Sale as of June 30, 1970," and that said
figure should be readjusted to a maximum of TwentyOne Thousand Dollars, ($21,000.00), if the court finds
that the trucks should have been sold on June 30, 1970,
or completely eliminated, if the court finds that the
respondent had no duty to sell the trucks as of June
30, 1970.
POINT VII
T H E R E S P O N D E N T D I D NOT H A V E
A N O B L I G A T I O N TO R E P O S S E S S
T H E SEVEN TRUCKS I N QUESTION
U N T I L T H E T I M E I T D I D SO, A N D
T H E A P P E L L A N T IS NOT, T H E R E F O R E , E N T I T L E D TO A F O R T Y
THOUSAND S E V E N
HUNDRED
F I F T Y D O L L A R S , ($40,750.00), O F F SET, A N D T H E T R I A L COURT'S
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE INCREASE D BY T H A T AMOUNT.
As set out in the appellant's Statement of Fact,
the transaction involved in this case was not a clear-cut
one-to-one transaction, but was complicated by the fact
that after Scott Trucking Company acquired some interest in the seven vehicles in question in a transfer between the appellant and itself, and agreed to by the
respondent, Scott Trucking started returning the trucks
to the appellant, who in turn took them to Mack Trucks,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
Inc.'s Denver, Colorado, branch where they abandoned
them. Thereafter, Mr. Adams of Mack Financial Corporation attempted to get Scott Trucking and Nevada
Motor Rentals to agree upon the disposition of the
vehicles, and agree how the two interested parties would
take care of a deficiency. After no response was received
from Scott Trucking or Nevada Motor Rentals, a legal
action was commenced to resolve the dispute, but because of jurisdictional problems, Scott Trucking Company could not be retained in the Utah action and refused to cooperate in having the trucks voluntarily repossessed and sold. I t was not until January of 1972
that the parties reached agreement that the trucks could
be repossessed and sold without affecting the rights of
the other parties involved, and immediately upon Scott
Trucking Company's consenting to the repossession and
sale the seven trucks were repossessed and sold within a
very short period of time.
While the Uniform Commercial Code may have
given the respondent the right to repossess and re-sell
the vehicles in question, it certainly did not impose upon
it the duty to do so. To the contrary, the Uniform Commercial Code specifically provides that the seller can
elect the remedy that he wishes to pursue against the
defaulting buyer under a security agreement. In Section
9-501(1), it states:
" When a debtor is in default under the security
agreement, a secured party has the rights and
remedies provided in this part . . . and those
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provided in the security agreement. H e may
reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or
otherwise enforce the security interest by any
available judicial procedure."
The respondent in the instant case chose initially
to pursue the remedy of requiring the defendant to pay
on the contract. The respondent did not choose initially
to repossess the vehicles and to sell them at public or
private sale. Accordingly, the appellant should not be
allowed to abandon the vehicles on the respondent's
sister corporation's property, and force the respondent
to elect the remedy of repossessing the vehicles. As noted
above, the respondent did not repossess the vehicles
until January of 1972, but to the contrary requested
that the appellant remove the vehicles from its sister
corporation's lot.
In Auto Cars Sales and Service, Inc. v. Hansen,
270 N.Y. 414, I N . E . 2d 830 (1936), a truck was sold
by the plaintiff to the defendant under a conditional
sales contract. The truck was damaged and the insurance company insuring for the benefit of both the plaintiff and defendant, ordered that the truck be taken to
the plaintiff- seller's lot. During the time the truck was
on the plaintiff's lot, the plaintiff never offered to return the truck to the defendant, and the defendant never
offered to pick it up, and there was never a demand
made for its return. The defendant argued that inasmuch
as the truck was in the possession of the plaintiff, he
had repossessed the truck, and had failed to resell the
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truck within the 30-day statutory period. The court
rejected the defendant's argument, and pointed out that
the plaintiff had never taken any steps itself or through
the sheriff or any other agent to take possession of the
truck, and that the plaintiff had not, within the meaning
of the statute, repossessed the truck and therefore should
not be denied deficiency judgment.
In the instant case, not only did the plaintiff-respondent, Mack Financial Corporation, not take any
steps to repossess the trucks, but specifically demanded
that the defendant-appellant get the trucks off the plaintiff-respondent's sister corporation's lot.
A similar situation occurred in Brandon v. General
Motors Acceptance Corporation, 223 Ark. 850, 268
S.W. 2d 898 (1954), where the defendant-purchaser
abandoned his automobile, and the creditor took possession of the automobile only to protect and preserve the
automobile. The court ruled that there was no repossession under the contract at the time the automobile was
abandoned, and that therefore once the vehicle was sold,
the creditor was entitled to a deficiency judgment. In
accord with that decision, is also Newberry v. Morris,
233 Ark. 938, 349 S.W. 2d, 652 (1941). See also Kahl
IK Winfrey, 81 Ariz. 199, 303 P . 2d 526 (1956), where
the court ruled that a voluntary surrender of merchandise was not a "re-taking" or repossession by the seller
that would compel the re-sale within 30 days as provided
in the statute.
In light of the restrictions placed upon a creditor
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in re-taking its security by the United States Supreme
Court's decision of Fuentes, et. ah v. Shevin, et. al.y 407
U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972), the
respondent was justified in not electing to repossess the
vehicles until the time it repossessed them, and after
repossessing them, considering the fact that they had to
be conditioned for the sale, and the sale had to be advertised sufficiently, that the sale was totally reasonable,
and the appellant should not have received the offset
in the sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
Dollars, ($40,750.00), and that amount should be
added to the judgment already entered by the trial court
in respondent's favor.
POINT VIII

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO A W A R D THE RESPONDENT ATTORNEYS FEES, AND THE
CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
THE PURPOSE OF HAVING THE
COURT TAKE EVIDENCE ON THAT
POINT, AND ENTERING AN A W A R D
FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEYS
FEES.
The extension of conditional sale agreement or
chattel mortgage executed between the appellant and
the respondent, (Exhibit 3-P and 4-P), provides: "If
this agreement shall be placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, the buyer shall pay to Financial
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reasonable attorneys fees as specified in said document,
if permitted by law." Based upon that provision for
attorneys fees, the respondent sought recovery of its
attorneys fees; however, the trial court denied the award
of attorneys fees based upon the possibility that had the
seven trucks in question been sold by June 30, 1970, the
appellant may have paid the deficiency to the plaintiff
on a voluntary basis, and thereby have avoided the lawsuit. There was, however, no evidence that they would
have done so, and as a matter of fact, the respondent
had filed its lawsuit against the appellant prior to that
time.
This court has recognized the rights of parties to
contract and the court's obligation to enforce those
contracts on many occasions. In particular, this court
has recognized the rights of parties to contract for the
payment of attorneys fees and have recognized the
court's duty to enforce those contracts, leaving to the
court the right to discipline the attorney if the fee
charged is unconscionable. See Thatcher v. Industrial
Commission, 207 P . 2d 178.
Even though the Utah Supreme Court has never
dealt with the exact question raised by the trial court's
denial to award attorneys fees based upon the contract
being sued upon, there is no authority known to the
respondent whereby that provision of the contract should
be disregarded where the court enforces all of the other
conditions of the contract.
The fact that the appellant continues to resist the
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payment of anything to the respondent, even after the
trial court awarded it a offset in the sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars, ($40,750.00),
is indictive that at no point in time would the appellant
have voluntarily settled a deficiency, but is evidence
of the fact that the appellant has been and is totally
unwilling to pay damage it has caused the respondent by
its breach of the sales contract.
CONCLUSIONS
I t is respectfully submitted that the court should
sustain the trial court's decision in part and reverse it
in part, by deleting the offset in the sum of Forty Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars, ($40,750.00),
and also directing the trial court to take evidence concerning reasonable attorneys fees, and to award the respondent its fees incurred for legal services in prosecuting the action against the appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & H A N N I

By
Wendell E . Bennett
604 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
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